Why Judicial Reversal of Apartheid Made a Difference by Fischel, William A.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 51 
Issue 4 Issue 4 - Colloquium: Rethinking 
Buchanan v. Warley 
Article 5 
5-1998 
Why Judicial Reversal of Apartheid Made a Difference 
William A. Fischel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William A. Fischel, Why Judicial Reversal of Apartheid Made a Difference, 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 975 
(1998) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol51/iss4/5 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Why Judicial Reversal of Apartheid
Made a Difference
William A. Fischel*
Did Buchanan v. Warley' have any practical effect on the eco-
nomic well-being of black Americans? Michael Klarman argues that
it did not, since the enforcement of racial segregation proceeded along
other lines, such as regular zoning, iacial covenants, informal dis-
crimination, and unofficial violence.2 David Bernstein disagrees in
part with Kiarman's conclusion. He argues that Buchanan v. Warley
effectively made more housing available to blacks in urban areas,
even if it did not promote racial integration.3
I second Bernstein's conclusion by putting Buchanan in the
context of the urban-economics theory of housing segregation.
Because Buchanan helped blacks gain a foothold, albeit a segregated
one, in central cities, it was instrumental in facilitating the Great
Migration of blacks from the rural South to urban areas in the North.
Had Buchanan v. Warley been decided the other way, the American
civil rights movement might have played out differently. Without
housing in central city areas of the North, blacks would have been
less able to generate political support for the federal civil rights legis-
lation of the 1960s. As KIarman has argued elsewhere, the creation of
a northern black urban community greatly facilitated this legislation. 4
Without the urban concentration of blacks facilitated by Buchanan v.
Warley, the civil rights movement could have been delayed or have
found other channels.
I use the term "apartheid" to describe the system at issue in
Buchanan instead of "segregation" because apartheid carries specific
* Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College.
1. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
2. Michael Karman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 883,
943-45 (1998).
3. David Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in
Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 799, 861-63 (1998).
4. See Michael J. Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It
Matter?, 83 GEo. L.J. 433, 456 (1994).
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connotations of legally enforced residential segregation.5 Racial seg-
regation exists in American cities, but it is not officially compelled by
the law of the land. The law of the land for a long time tolerated and
enforced private covenants that had racial exclusion as their objective.
And law enforcement officers often looked the other way when private
violence excluded blacks from white areas. However, one needs to
make a hostile stretch of the English language to characterize the
American pattern of segregation since Buchanan v. Warley as apart-
heid.6
1. Racial segregation can come from white aversion.
Here is the urban-economics take on racial segregation.7
Imagine a fully-developed (i.e., no vacant land) city neighborhood
inhabited by black people that is adjacent to a fully developed neigh-
borhood inhabited by white people. Assume for the sake of argument
that the quality of housing is the same in both neighborhoods.
However, the price of housing is not exactly the same in the two
neighborhoods. The model assumes that whites have an aversion to
living near blacks. As a result of this aversion, whites are willing to
pay less for housing adjacent to blacks.
It is assumed, moreover, that blacks have no similar aversion
to living near the white neighborhood border. As a result, the situ-
ation just described-whites living in the same quality of housing
next to blacks-cannot be an equilibrium condition. Owners of hous-
5. Apartheid, of course, refers to the official policy of segregation that prevailed for many
years in South Africa, and its most distinguishing (and hated) element was legally enforced
residential segregation. Contemporary advocates of residential segregation made the connec-
tion with South Africa's territorial segregation. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and
Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 1: The Heyday of Jim
Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 501 (1982) (describing suggestions made by segregation advocates
to segregate rural land by popular referendum, based on South African practice).
6. Two sociologists are willing to make that stretch by titling their otherwise useful book
on residential segregation "American Apartheid." See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY
A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
Judge Higginbotham, however, argued that South African apartheid and American residential
segregation were different, and that apartheid was far more damaging to blacks than American
residential segregation. Referring specifically to Buchanan, he and his coauthors declared, "The
focus of this article is to demonstrate how much worse it would have been if the United States
did not have ... those opinions of the Supreme Court which struck down some of the racist state
legislation and judicial decrees." A. Leon Higginbotham et al., De Jure Housing Segregation in
the United States and South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit for Racial Justice, 1990 U. ILL. L.
REV. 763, 769.
7. The model was first developed by Martin Bailey, A Note on the Economics of
Residential Zoning and Urban Renewal, 35 LAND ECON. 288 (1959). My description here is
based on the variation presented in EDWIN S. MILLS & BRUCE W. HAMILTON, URBAN ECONOMICS
261-64 (4th ed. 1989).
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ing in the white neighborhoods will find that blacks are willing to pay
more for it than whites near the black/white border. As owner-occu-
pied housing comes on the market or as tenants' leases come due,
blacks will be the dominant buyers. Thus the border of the neighbor-
hoods will change, with whites moving away and blacks moving in.
This process applies to an entire urban core, in which blacks
locate initially, and then expand outward. Low income migrants will
choose central city locations because the housing there is often older
and more run-down and hence cheaper to rent or buy. Central city
location also enables them to economize on commuting expenditures.
From this core, the border between blacks and whites will expand, as
blacks outbid whites for housing in a competitive market. This pro-
cess ends only when the price of housing inside the all-black district
equals the price of housing on the border with whites. At that point,
blacks no longer have any incentive to move into white neighborhoods,
since the housing is the same price for blacks everywhere.
This model predicts that white aversion causes blacks to have
lower housing costs, a controversial implication. It does not say that
the segregation that results from this process is beneficial to blacks.
However, it does suggest that in a competitive housing market (one in
which neither buyers nor sellers collude), white prejudice is costly to
whites and provides a partly offsetting compensation to blacks. The
short-run cost to whites of this process is the capital loss they sustain
on their property as the border sweeps over their neighborhood.
Blacks do not cause this reduced housing value; they do not care (in
this model's characterization of behavior) whether they live next to
blacks or whites. The loss is caused by white buyers' aversion to liv-
ing next to blacks.8 Even if a few white homeowners have no racial
aversion, they suffer a capital loss as the white part of the housing
market declines to bid for their homes once their homes are on the
border between black and white neighborhoods.
Economic tests of this model have been controversial, and its
housing price implications have not been borne out in most cities.9 An
obvious implication of the model is that in the long run, whites should
end up paying more for housing on average than blacks. Evidence
prior to 1970 suggests, however, that whites do not pay more for
"comparable quality" housing in urban areas.
8. In more sophisticated versions of this model, whites are only averse to living in
neighborhoods with a critical proportion of blacks, but this does not change the long-run result.
9. For a review of the econometric tests, see MILLS & HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 261,
and JOHN F. McDoNALD, FUNDAMENTALS OF URBAN ECONOMICS 213-14 (1997).
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The basic model does not predict price differences very well
because whites are hardly the passive participants that the model
posits. The model's operation means that many whites suffer capital
losses as homeowners and suffer higher housing prices or commuting
costs as they flee from neighborhoods near blacks to less conveniently
located areas of the city. So whites develop a host of institutions to
hold back the tide of their own prejudice.10 They boycott real estate
dealers and ostracize former neighbors who sell to blacks. To avoid
this reaction, real estate salespeople are encouraged to "steer" blacks
to other neighborhoods. White homeowners resort to intimidation
and violence against black pioneers in white neighborhoods. They are
willing to pay a premium in neighborhoods in which owners have
agreed to restrictive covenants that exclude blacks.
2. Covenants and other forms of discrimination are costly.
The trouble, from the white homeowners' point of view, with
the foregoing mechanisms to prevent black-neighborhood expansion is
that they often do not work very well. This is because of the well
known "free rider" problem in economics."l Among prejudiced whites,
an all-white neighborhood is a "public good." Such a "good" is non-
rival and non-excludable in consumption. Thus if a black family
moves into a neighborhood, the well-being of all prejudiced whites is
reduced, even though they may have no direct interaction with the
newcomer. Indeed, the only person who has an immediate economic
interaction with the newcomer is the seller who has most likely de-
parted herself from the neighborhood or, as a landlady, may not live
there herself. While a neighboring white homeowner might be willing
to pay something to blacks to move out of his neighborhood, his ability
to combine his monetary offering with his neighbors' is complicated by
the free rider problem of such goods. His white neighbor will think,
"If he is willing to pay let him. We will both benefit, and I won't have
to pay." Such reasoning would, in situations in which no coercive en-
forcement of collective action is possible, often defeat attempts to
exclude blacks.
It is often in the interest of at least a few whites to sell to
blacks. Some blacks may have a preference for integrated
10. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 6; CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN
NEIGHBORS (1955) (discussing the link between housing problems and American prejudice).
11. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 44 (5th ed. 1989); Jennifer Roback, Racism as Rent Seeking, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 661,
665 (1989) (connecting public good theory with racial prejudice and discrimination).
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neighborhoods and be willing to offer more than whites. Or some
white homeowners might anticipate that the neighborhood may be
about to be integrated, and they may want to sell quickly. Excluding
all blacks from the market would often mean that homeowners who
are selling get lower offers for what is usually the largest single asset
they own.
Hence there will be strong incentives to breach agreements not
to sell to blacks. Some real estate salespeople will agree to endure the
"fly-by-night" reputation that comes from failing to steer blacks away.
Some property owners will decline to burden their land with
restrictions on who may occupy it. Approached by others eager to
provide the "public good" of racial purity, these uncooperative folks
will take advantage of the situation and sell to blacks.
Thus it was, in the absence of apartheid laws like those at
issue in Buchanan, very difficult to keep the black/white border from
moving in ways adverse to whites. In fact, it must have been nearly
impossible in most situations. We know this not from econometric
studies about who paid what for housing, but from the simple demo-
graphic fact that the black ghetto took root and expanded in virtually
every large city.12 One prediction of the model that is borne out by
experience is that the black neighborhood tends to expand along the
borders, leaving more housing available to blacks than they otherwise
would have had. In other words, although there was discrimination
and segregation in northern cities, things could have been worse for
blacks.
3. Ordinary zoning is not an effective substitute for racial zoning.
The development of ordinary zoning-classifying districts
according to permitted uses-paralleled the racial zoning that was
overturned in Buchanan. The closeness of their development seems
to have led Bernstein to suggest that ordinary zoning accomplished
much the same goals. 1 In conjunction with racial covenants and cov-
ert discrimination by zoning boards in issuing discretionary permits,
ordinary zoning is argued to have been a close substitute for racial
zoning.
12. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 6, at 75-77 (discussing hypersegregation in U.S.
metropolitan areas).
13. See Bernstein, supra note 3, at 864-66; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 6, at
19981 979
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This argument likely does not apply to the already-developed
areas of cities to which black immigrants were most likely to come.
Most developed areas were already zoned for the predominating land
uses. Although zoning committees in the 1910s contemplated expel-
ling nonconforming uses, the ensuing controversy led most cities to
permit nonconformers to continue if they were not too noxious. 14 Only
important changes in pre-existing uses required zoning actions. As a
result, the existing, older housing stock in central cities that was most
important for black migrants was largely untouched by zoning.
Conversions from single-family to multi-family use in older
sections may have required zoning actions, and these changes could
have provided opportunities to discriminate by race. But even here
discrimination could be avoided by straw-buyers. After the conver-
sion was allowed for whites, the owners could not be stopped by zon-
ing from selling or renting to blacks. Of course, they could still be
stopped by private covenants, but zoning did not by itself facilitate the
adoption of covenants.
Zoning would have some bite as applied to undeveloped land.
First, it could discourage the construction of low-cost units that would
be demanded by most poor black immigrants. Many observers believe
that this is an important, if not the primary, purpose of suburban
zoning restrictions on apartments and other low-cost housing.15 But
this type of zoning affects poor whites as well as blacks. No doubt
variances and exceptions could be made for whites, but the resale
problem again arises. Moreover, general restrictions on development
of high-density housing are resisted by many influential whites, in-
cluding developers, real estate agencies, and landowners. These
interests are especially influential in larger jurisdictions such as older
cities.16
Zoning in smaller suburbs tends to be less responsive to out-
sider, prodevelopment interests, which would likely make it more
difficult to develop low income housing in suburbs. 7 But this process
jumps far ahead of the Buchanan story. My contention is that
14. See MARC A. WEISS, THE RISE OF THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS 81-86 (1987).
15. See Edwin S. Mills, Economic Analysis of Urban Land-Use Controls, in CURRENT
ISSUES IN URBAN ECONOMICS 511, 518-19 (Peter Mieszkowski & Mahlon Straszheim eds., 1979).
16. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS
APPROACH To AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 212-13 (1985) (discussing interests present in
larger cities) [hereinafter FISCHEL, ZONING].
17. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 405-07 (1977) (detailing the ability of homeowners in small
communities to repress and/or exclude proponents of development, especially those who favor
low-income housing).
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Buchanan allowed a large stock of existing housing in central cities to
be occupied by those blacks who managed to deal with the extra-legal
restraints.
That ordinary zoning was not primarily a means of racial dis-
crimination is suggested by its rapid spread to nearly all areas of the
country. Had it been largely a substitute for racial zoning, it would
have been adopted most rapidly in cities experiencing racial change.
No evidence suggests that pattern, though I cannot categorically deny
its existence. 18 A real estate manual of the period endorsed both ra-
cial covenants and zoning for protecting property values, but it does
not connect the two other than to note that racial zoning had recently
been declared unconstitutional. 9
4. Housing near jobs was especially important to blacks.
The American pattern of urban demography is taken so much
for granted that we overlook that it could have developed otherwise.
In the American pattern, low-income immigrants, particularly blacks,
purchase older housing in the central residential areas of most large
cities. The ghetto then expands, seldom without controversy, but
usually successfully, as more blacks arrive to make expanding it prof-
itable.
In most cities prior to World War I, job opportunities were
concentrated in the center of cities. Until low-cost commuter trans-
portation came along, most people needed to live close to their jobs.20
Thus the concentration of blacks near the center of cities also helped
them by making jobs more accessible. White flight from the center of
the city made white workers' commutes longer. In other words, de-
parting whites were initially subject to "spatial mismatch"21 between
jobs and housing. In the longer run, jobs may have moved to the sub-
urbs so that blacks in central cities lost their location advantages, but
that issue did not play out until after World War II.
18. Of the 31 large cities listed in a national survey in the early 1920s, 16 had zoning. Of
the six southern cities on the list, three had zoning. See STANLEY L. MCMICHAEL & ROBERT F.
BINGHAM, CITY GROWTH AND VALUES 369 (1923).
19. See id. at 182, 326.
20. See generally SAM B. WARNER, STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN
BOSTON, 1870-1900 (1962); see also Stephen F. LeRoy & Jon Sonstelie, Paradise Lost and
Regained: Transportation Innovation, Income and Residential Location, 13 J. URB. ECON. 67,
67-69 (1983) (assessing the impact of falling costs of commuting on the poor's access to suburban
residential locations).
21. Harry J. Holzer et al., Work, Search, and Travel Among White and Black Youth, 35 J.
URB. ECON. 320, 320-21 (1994) (defining the concept of spatial mismatch).
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Consider how cities might have evolved had the apartheid laws
been successful. Blacks would have been confined to a few areas in
which they had become a majority prior to the adoption of the law.
Some neighborhoods nearby might have changed as a result of vari-
ances granted by authorities, but I will argue in the next section that
these would be rare, given the overwhelming support for the ordi-
nances by most whites and the racial attitudes of the period. In order
to accommodate the Great Migration, existing neighborhoods with a
majority of blacks would quickly have become all black, and condi-
tions would have become even more crowded than they actually did
without benefit of the apartheid laws. Expansion into contiguous
residential neighborhoods, which was the halting but inevitable proc-
ess of ghetto expansion, would have been foreclosed.
New subdivisions outside of the city might have been built to
accommodate the black demand to move to metropolitan areas. Since
most black immigrants were poor, they could only have afforded new
housing of very low quality. Not being located near center-city serv-
ices, such areas would usually lack public infrastructure such as
water and sewers. In other words, the suburban black ghetto would
look more like the shanty-towns that have sprung up at the periphery
of many cities in the third-world.
Suburban ghettos would probably have been even worse for
black migrants than the central city ghettos. Employment opportuni-
ties-then concentrated in the central business district-would have
been more remote and even less likely to be served by public transit.
And suburban ghettos would have been quite scattered, since restric-
tive covenants would have been much easier to impose on the unde-
veloped land in the suburbs.
Black political action would have been even more difficult to
organize in exurban ghettos because of communication problems. A
more dispersed black community would also have been more subject
to the physical intimidation that kept civil rights activities at a mini-
mum in small southern towns. In short, decentralized ghettos might
have been worse than the central city ghettos that did develop. And
the repelling effect of exurban ghettos on potential black workers
would have slowed the Great Migration. The Civil Rights movement
spawned by it would have had to find another channel.
5. Local economic pressure would not have reversed apartheid.
Of course, had Buchanan gone the other way, the disastrous
scenario I have limned would not necessarily have occurred. Much of
982 [Vol. 51:975
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my recent scholarship has focused on the divergence between what
happens in the courtroom and what happens on the ground (or, in my
best example, under the ground). I showed in my most recent book
that the decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon22 had almost no
effect on the problem it supposedly addressed.23
Underground mining of anthracite coal was causing damage to
surface homes in Scranton, Pennsylvania and its environs in the early
1900s. In response to surface owners' concerns, the state legislature
passed the Kohler Act, which enjoined the mining of coal in urban
areas if there was a danger of subsidence. The problem with the law
was that most surface owners had deeds in which the right to mine
coal and the right to surface support were explicitly retained by the
coal companies. Indeed, the right of support had recently been held
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to be an estate in land, separate
from surface rights and mining rights.
The uncompensated transfer of the right of support from the
coal companies to the surface owners was held by the U.S. Supreme
Court to be in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. In an opinion by
none other than Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the Kohler Act was
struck down as having "gone too far" with the police power.
Pennsylvania Coal is popularly regarded as the first regulatory
takings case.2 4 Commentators who are hostile to the concept of regu-
latory takings have pointed out the dire consequences of the Kohler
Act, suggesting that mining subsidence was wrecking housing in
Scranton. 5 My on-site research of the case revealed, however, that
Pennsylvania Coal changed nothing. Coal companies fixed surface
damage that they caused, without charge to the owner, regardless of
who owned the right of support.2 6 This practice had begun several
years prior to the Kohler Act and continued after it was struck down.
There were two reasons for Pennsylvania Coal's lack of impact.
The less important one is that some surface owners bought their sup-
port rights back from the coal company. The company was willing to
22. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
23. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 13-47
(1995) [hereinafter FISCHEL, TAKINGS].
24. For indications of this view and an extensive argument that Pennsylvania Coal was
not originally thought of as a Takings Clause case, see Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our
'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence"." The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996).
25. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL 124-35 (1973).
26. See FISCHEL, TAKINGS, supra note 23, at 29-30, 37-42.
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sell coal in place, so that no subsidence would occur, at a fixed and
relatively modest price. However, only a few such transactions took
place, mostly purchases by large business owners. Most homeowners
were simply given an informal liability rule by the coal companies. If
they damaged the home, they would fix it at their expense. When I
asked the last surviving management official of the Pennsylvania
Coal Company why his company did it, he said it was "just good pub-
lic relations."27
I inferred from other sources, including an autobiography of
the author of the Kohler Act and an interview with his son,28 that coal
companies made good on their promises because of indirect economic
reasons and social pressures. To mine as they were entitled to before
the Kohler Act was passed and after Pennsylvania Coal was decided
would have driven their own workers out of the city. Moreover, min-
ing company officials had extensive social ties with surface owners
throughout the city, so they had a personal interest in "good public
relations." Caving in the house of a lodge-brother was not considered
good form.
The coal mine case has some parallels with Buchanan v.
Warley. Holmes was initially inclined to dissent in Buchanan, and
the dissenting opinion he wrote but did not publish reveals that he
saw the apartheid issue in the same terms that he saw the anti-sub-
sidence measure.29 Of the apartheid act at issue in Buchanan, he said
in 1917: "The value of property may be diminished in many ways by
ordinary legislation as well as by the police power properly so called
without any constitutional obligation to pay the owner unless the
diminution reaches such a magnitude as to necessitate the exercise of
eminent domain."30 Of the coal-mine subsidence act, Holmes declared
in 1922, for the majority:
One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the
diminution [in value]. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in
27. Interview with E. Stewart Milner in Dunmore, Pa. (June 28, 1993 & Oct. 3, 1993)
summarized in FISCHEL, TAKINGS, supra note 23, at 38 (notes on file with the author).
28. See PHILIP V. MATTES, TALES OF SCRANTON (1974) (privately published by the author;
date of publication is inferred from biographical information. A copy is in the Scranton Public
Library, and a photocopy of relevant chapters is on file with William A. Fischel); see also Philip
V. Mattes, The Mine-Cave Struggle, in JUBILEE HISTORY OF LACKAWANNA COUNTY (Thomas
Murphy ed., 1928). Interview discussed in FISOHEL, TAKINGS, supra note 23, at 39. Interview
notes on file with the Author.
29. The unpublished opinion is reprinted in Schmidt, supra note 5, at 512-13. Holmes
ultimately voted with the majority in Buchanan, which was unanimous. He was apparently not
displeased with the Buchanan decision, as he quoted it at length in his opinion in Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), which struck down the Texas whites-only primary.
30. Schmidt, supra note 5, at 513 (citations omitted).
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all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts. The
greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but it always is
open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its
constitutional power.
3 1
Holmes did not think that the diminution of value of
Buchanan's property by the apartheid law was so large as to warrant
the exercise of eminent domain. Holmes said that the claim of com-
plete diminution by Buchanan "obviously sounds too much in proph-
ecy to be regarded as an allegation of fact."32 By implication, Holmes
would have seen no problem with an apartheid ordinance that offered
compensation for black and white property owners. Of course, had
compensation been required, it is doubtful that much segregation
could have been accomplished. The fact that whites were unwilling to
outbid blacks for houses in changing neighborhoods is evidence that,
collectively, whites could not have paid blacks to stay out of their
neighborhoods.
Someone trained in the economics of law would invoke the
Coase theorem to analyze this situation.33 If blacks were willing to
pay more for housing in a given area than whites, then it should not
matter whether whites are entitled to exclude blacks or not. If whites
cannot exclude them collectively (as was the case after Buchanan),
then blacks will outbid them for housing. If whites are entitled to
collective exclusion of blacks via the apartheid rule (before
Buchanan), then blacks will compensate whites to change the laws to
allow them to buy. Reasons of self-interested exchange might suggest
that it did not matter which way Buchanan was decided.
Susan Rose-Ackerman wrote an article that examined the
theoretical economics of such transactions in an urban setting 4 She
characterized the apartheid privileges of whites as operating either as
a profit-maximizing cartel or as a vote-maximizing local government.
In either case, some level of black demand to be let into the neighbor-
hood will prompt whites to collectively change their laws.
Rose-Ackerman demonstrated that an apartheid-collective
possesses some monopoly power over locations in the city, and the
bigger the area that adopts apartheid, the less likely a transaction
31. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
32. Schmidt, supra note 5, at 513.
33. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
34. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of a Racist Housing Market, 4 J.
URB. ECON. 150 (1977). Rose-Ackerman was not examining Buchanan v. Warley specifically or
invoking the Coase theorem, but her analysis did provisionally assume an apartheid rule.
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could take place. Whites would hold out for a higher price to vacate
the neighborhood if a single cartel forestalled blacks from bidding for
alternative neighborhoods. Since most apartheid laws were passed as
city ordinances and most neighborhoods were occupied by whites, the
monopoly power problem might have applied.
But the real problem with the Coasean analysis is the one that
Coase himself wanted his readers to pay attention to.35 The transac-
tion costs of making the payments that Rose-Ackerman envisioned
are enormous. How would blacks even organize to make such pay-
ments? Most of those who would benefit would not even be in the
jurisdiction. Perhaps some entrepreneurial real-estate developers
could arrange to deal with the white organization in order to profit
from housing. But to internalize such profits, the entrepreneurs
would have to be able to control the subsequent sales of housing.
Otherwise, other entrepreneurs would reap all of the benefits of the
subsequent sales by whites to blacks. The costs of maintaining com-
plete control over a changing neighborhood's housing stock would
seem prohibitive at any realistic estimate of profitability.
The transaction costs on the other side are at least as prob-
lematic. White homeowners would have to agree collectively to sell to
blacks. This agreement would be similar to changing present-day
zoning laws to nonresidential uses. Homeowners who are adversely
affected have the power in most cases to block such change. The
transaction costs of persuading those adversely affected are substan-
tial, and they do inhibit land-use changes.36 Considering the greater
emotional charge of changing an apartheid law, few offers of compen-
sation by blacks, if they could be organized, would be accepted by
whites.
6. Informal and local political forces would not budge apartheid.
Might there have been more subtle ways to get apartheid to
loosen its grip? In Scranton, I identified several factors that induced
efficient transactions to be made by a form of implicit exchange. Mine
owners did not want to destroy the houses of their workers, or to
endure the social ostracism that being careless of surface owners'
homes would have brought.
35. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKT, AND THE LAW (1988); R.H. Coase, The Coase
Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L. & ECON. 183 (1981).
36. See ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 84-111 (1977); FISCHEL,
ZONING, supra note 16, at 69-78.
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But the Pennsylvania Coal denouement resulted from condi-
tions in which people had an incentive to make accommodation with
one another. Surface owners and mine owners were locked into a
relationship by the need of mine owners for workers and of surface
owners for jobs in the mines. I will ask whether mutual interests
between white homeowners and black workers might have diluted the
apartheid laws at issue in Buchanan v. Warley.
Businesses that employed blacks in northern cities might have
lobbied against apartheid. Businesses drew black workers to north-
ern cities because they offered better wages than blacks could get in
the rural South, even if they were below what white workers were
paid.37 The gain to employers was lower cost labor, which became
increasingly important once World War I stopped the influx of poor
European workers.38 The employers would have realized that the
apartheid laws would make it more difficult for them to attract black
workers, because both housing and transportation costs would be too
high. For the sake of naked self interest, industrial employers might
have prevailed on cities not to adopt apartheid.
There was a parallel in the school segregation cases. Economic
historian Robert Margo asked why whites in the deep south bothered
to provide any schooling for blacks, given that the "equal" half of
separate but equal was not enforced. 39 He found that local white
employers often lobbied county school officials to provide black schools
because blacks workers would otherwise not move there. In a similar
vein, Gerald Rosenberg presents evidence that desegregation of
Southern schools in the 1960s was promoted in part by local
businesses.40 Businesses were motivated not by principles of equality,
but by the difficulty of attracting employees to the South if schools
were unfunded and in continual turmoil. 41 It seems possible, then,
that urban employers in the 1910s might have formed an interest-
group counterweight to local government apartheid that might have
mitigated its worst excesses.
While some of this might have occurred, it likely would not
have rolled back apartheid to any important degree. In the foregoing
37. See ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 24.
38. See Kiarman, supra note 2, at 900.
39. See Robert A. Margo, Segregated Schools and the Mobility Hypothesis: A Model of
Local Government Discrimination, 106 Q.J. ECON. 61 (1991) (arguing that competition for black
labor created an incentive for southern whites to fund black schools).
40. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 100-02 (1991).
41. As Rosenberg notes, the carrot of federal aid for schools was withheld if desegregation
was not forthcoming. See id. at 100.
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examples, business interests wanted simply to enforce the law of the
land. That is, they argued in the earlier period for better schools for
blacks under the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,42
and they argued in favor of integration in the 1960s under the Brown
decision and the Civil Rights Acts. Had Buchanan v. Warley gone the
other way, businesses in the World War I era would have had to take
a position against that of the courts and the state and local legis-
latures.
Businesses in northern cities that would have employed blacks
faced some organizational problems themselves. Northern metropoli-
tan areas were fragmented, with several independent jurisdictions
making up the urban area. Although the fragmentation had not
reached its present-day stage, in which the structure of local govern-
ments looks more competitive than most industries,43 independent
suburbs were rapidly developing in the early 1900s.4 In such a situ-
ation, people associated with a particular industry were unlikely to
live in the same place in which they were employed.
Moreover, local governments are somewhat less likely to re-
spond to special interests in formulating legislation.45 Apartheid laws
were likely responding to a democratic majority at the local level,
most of whom were whites concerned about their home values. They
had the appeal of home and hearth on their side. There is no record of
any of the apartheid laws having been rescinded or substantially
modified prior to Buchanan v. Warley in 1917.46
The final possibility is that homeowners and apartment own-
ers themselves might have found that apartheid did not pay. By
shutting out blacks as prospective tenants, the laws injured apart-
ment owners. Some homeowners would have realized that if they
held out against panic selling as neighborhoods began to change, they
could sell their homes at a normal or perhaps even higher price to
42. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
43. See generally William A. Fischel, Is Local Government Structure in Large Urbanized
Areas Monopolistic or Competitive?, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 95 (1981) (arguing that local government
structure is competitive in that varied fragmented municipalities may compete against one
another for zoning or local ordinances).
44. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE & COMMITTEE OF METROPOLITIAN GOVERNMENT,
THE GOVERNMENT OF METROPOLITAN AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES 7-22 (prepared by Paul
Studenski, 1930).
45. See Ellickson, supra note 17, at 405 (noting that the lack of multiple issues reduces
the need for small governments to address minority interests).
46. Garret Power notes some fine tuning of Baltimore's laws to make them more constitu-
tionally defensible, but not to mitigate their effects on blacks. See Garrett Power, Apartheid
Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289
(1983). Moreover, there were several unsuccessful attempts to re-establish the laws by subter-
fuge after the decision. See ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 210.
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blacks later on. But these forces seem even weaker than the motives
of employers. The impact of the apartheid laws would have been
obvious to them from the very start (unlike the perhaps delayed im-
pact on employers), but the influence of anti-apartheid real estate
interests appears to have been weak.47
7. State courts and state politics would not have helped.
The state legislatures could have upended a contrary holding
in Buchanan v. Warley. Legislatures clearly had discretion over racial
segregation, and cities were subject to their rules. State governments
might have intervened if business interests had sought to override
local decisions. Businesses that are outvoted at the local level often
turn to state legislatures to override parochial decisions.48 Business
interests are typically better organized at the state level than
homeowners, and they might have at least mitigated the force of local
apartheid legislation.
Such a turn of events seems unlikely to have worked against
apartheid in the Buchanan era. Only some businesses gained from
having an additional stock of low-wage labor. Those not in a position
to hire blacks would have resisted the cost advantage that they of-
fered to businesses that could hire them. Moreover, white workers
would have resisted. White unions were seldom open to blacks, and
blacks were often used as strike breakers. 49 Although union activity
was not strong during this period, what influence organized labor had
was most likely felt at the state level. In South Africa, the influence
of businesses was largely countered by white trade unionists, who
were the major forces in favor of apartheid and related racial laws.50
The durability of segregated education in the United States is
also telling. Businesses that wanted a reasonably educated black
labor force seem to have had only a small effect on the quality of black
schools. That white business interests may have prevented black
schools from being eliminated is not to say that black schools were
satisfactory. The economic forces arrayed in favor of apartheid com-
47. That real estate interests sided with the NAACP in Buchanan is one indication of
their political weakness. I say appears because we do not know how many cities had apartheid
laws nipped in the bud by such influences.
48. See FISCHEL, TAKINGS, supra note 23, at 289-324.
49. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 6, at 28.
50. See MERLE LIPTON, CAPITALISM AND APARTHEID: SouTH AFRICA, 1910-84, at 183-226
(1985) (discussing the resistance of white labor in general toward easing apartheid, even when
doing so appeared to be in their economic best interest).
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bined with the lack of representation of potential black immigrants
makes it extremely unlikely that state legislatures would have over-
turned local apartheid laws.
State courts might have overturned racial zoning on state law
grounds, as some had done prior to Buchanan. There is reason to
believe, however, that the state courts would have been ineffective.
Even those state judges inclined to protect blacks or the property
rights of whites would have found it hard to resist the United States
Supreme Court's authority and prestige. The Maryland Supreme
Court, for example, struck down Baltimore's apartheid ordinance on
two occasions, but when an amended version was litigated a third
time, it declined to rule until Buchanan had been decided. 51
Supreme Court decisions upholding local land use controls
would have constrained state judges. Although Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,52 the major Supreme Court zoning case, was in the future,
the Court had shown little hostility to local land use regulations. The
Court had actually upheld the uncompensated expulsion of a pre-
existing land use in Hadacheck v. Sebastian.53 And most state court
judges are subject to an electoral review unknown at the federal
level.54 Unless a contrary decision in Buchanan v. Warley had been
followed by another Supreme Court decision that greatly narrowed
the force of the holding, state court review of the apartheid laws
would have favored the cities where it most mattered.
8. Conclusion: Buchanan satisfies process theory.
The world would have been a lot different, and certainly worse
for blacks, if Buchanan had been decided the other way. This is an
instance in which a big case had big effects. This case fits into the
Constitutional jurisprudence of John Hart Ely55 and (in part) of
Michael Klarman, 56 who have emphasized the comparative advantage
of the courts in encouraging the democratic process and, where the
process is attenuated by laws beyond its reach, to attempt a result
that would have been achieved under full enfranchisement.
51. See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 503.
52. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
53. 239 U.S. 394(1915).
54. See generally Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and
the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHi. L. REV. 689 (1995).
55. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
56. See generally Michael J. Kiarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory,
77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991).
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I think that apartheid legislation would not have been passed
by a democratic body that had a significant number of fully enfran-
chised blacks within its jurisdiction. As an example, a study of mod-
ern zoning in Atlanta showed that commercial rezonings that were
opposed by homeowners in black areas of the city were much less
common after the city was redistricted to give more representation to
blacks on the city council.57 If the Buchanan-era apartheid zoning
laws would not have been defeated at the city level, then a state gov-
ernment with a fair representation of blacks would have reined in the
cities.
One reason for courts to supervise local land use decisions is
that in many cases, those who bear the brunt of the regulation live
and vote outside of the jurisdiction.58 Owners of developable land
represent prospective residents who would be net additions to the
community (rather than buying existing homes). This is because
landowners' profitable development offers the newcomers housing at a
mutually advantageous price, a price that is lower than it would be if
only existing homes were for sale. However, owners of undeveloped
land are systematically outvoted in majoritarian elections in most
suburbs. 59 The importance of Buchanan v. Warley is another example
of why courts should not make a distinction between protecting
property and protecting people. In smaller jurisdictions, the owners
of developable land are often the best-and sometimes the
only-representatives of people who are not there. As Buchanan
illustrated, sometimes the only remedy for democratic break-down is
the principle of judicial review.
57. Dudley S. Hinds & Nicholas Ordway, The Influence of Race on Rezoning Decisions:
Equality of Treatment in Black and White Census Tracts, 1955-1980, in 14 REV. BLACK
POLITICAL ECON. 51, 51-63 (1986).
58. See FISCHEL, TAKINGS, supra note 23, at 115-40.
59. See Ellickson, supra note 17, at 406.
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